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Abstract

ABSTRACT
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (S-O Act) of 2002 requires principal officers to certify under oath
to the veracity of information contained in SEC filings and opine on the effectiveness of
the internal control system. This study examines the determinants and contents of
corporate voluntary disclosure of management’s responsibilities during the five-year
period preceding the S-O Act. We predict that the voluntary disclosure of management’s
responsibilities for financial information signals certain incentives and characteristics of
the reporting firm that are relevant to financial statement users and regulators. Consistent
with our predictions, our findings reveal significant differences between issuing and nonissuing firms as to the effectiveness of an individual firm’s internal control system, access
to capital markets, audit committee characteristics, and ownership structure. An empirical
analysis of the contents of these assertions also reveals different areas of emphasis and
selectivity by management, which represents an informative link to existing disclosure
mandates. The results of this study contribute to our knowledge of management’s
motivations for voluntary disclosure and lend credence to the mandatory certification
requirements and related disclosure reforms established in the post-Enron era.

i

Introduction

1. INTRODUCTION
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (S-O Act) of 2002 requires the principal executive and financial
officers of each publicly owned company to certify the veracity of information contained in SEC
filings and opine on the effectiveness of the internal control system. The Section 302 quarterly
certifications require a number of assertions by CEOs and CFOs, including a requirement to
report on the effectiveness of the design and operation of the company’s disclosure controls, their
responsibilities thereon, and to report significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in controls
to the external auditor and audit committee. Likewise, Section 404 requires senior executives to
report annually on their responsibilities for and effectiveness of the company’s internal controls
and procedures and disclose any material weaknesses.
The S-O legislation was preceded by a protracted and contentious debate over the benefits
and ramifications of disclosures concerning management’s responsibilities for financial
reporting. For almost 30 years, formal reporting remained non-mandatory, but senior
management at many publicly traded companies had voluntarily published a “Report of
Management’s Responsibility” (RMR)1 in annual shareholder reports. This study analyzes the
determinants of corporate voluntary disclosure of RMRs prior to the S-O Act and examines
management’s assertions disclosed in those voluntary RMRs.2 Our findings serve as an
informative “bridge” between these two eras and provide additional insights into the ongoing
debate of mandatory versus voluntary disclosure. Indeed, a recent study by Financial Executives
International (FEI 2005) of Section 404 disclosures reported “considerable variation in
management’s reports” (p. 5), and that “many firms added specific voluntary disclosures about
internal control and ethics initiatives” (p.19). Also, the SEC’s “Advisory Committee on Smaller
Public Companies” (Advisory Committee 2006, pp.6-7) has recommended a “tiered approach” to
Section 404 reporting that would partially or totally exempt certain smaller public companies
(based on market capitalization) from these requirements.3
1

Other titles used to describe these disclosures include “Report of Management,” “Management Report on Financial
Statements,” and “Management’s Responsibility for Financial Reporting.” In this study, the abbreviation “RMR” is
used.
2
Our tests focus primarily on characteristics of firms using RMRs as a disclosure policy. However, to gain more
insights into management’s incentives to issue an RMR, we also identify and analyze a subset of first-time issuers.
Anecdotal evidence and conversations with several chief executive officers and audit partners reveal that the
decision to issue an RMR emanates from management, although consultation with the company’s auditors and
lawyers is not uncommon.
3
The Advisory Committee was formed by the SEC in March 2005 in order to examine the burdens on smaller public
companies resulting from U.S. securities laws (particularly those related to the S-O Act) and to propose solutions to
these concerns (Advisory Committee 2006, p.1).
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Investors and accounting policy regulators demand relevant and reliable information from
public firms that is useful in making rational investment decisions. In satisfying investors’ needs
for information, firms tend to disclose the minimum-required information, with voluntary
disclosures provided on a cost-benefit basis. Accordingly, the voluntary disclosure of an RMR
signals certain characteristics and incentives of the reporting firm. These characteristics and
incentives shape the content and nature of management’s assertions when publicly declaring its
responsibilities to the users of financial statements as well as regulators. Since RMRs usually
include management assertions on the firm’s internal control effectiveness, audit committee, and
external auditor, issuing an RMR provides users of financial statements with an additional tool in
assessing the credibility and transparency of the firm’s reported accounting information.
Exploring the characteristics and incentives of firms that provide voluntary disclosure of
management responsibilities for financial reporting enhances users’ understanding of an entity’s
reporting strategy and presents users with additional information to consider in assessing the
accuracy and completeness of such financial disclosures. We predict that management’s decision
to voluntarily issue an RMR is influenced by a number of factors, including effective internal
controls, profitability, corporate governance structure, and access to capital markets. An effective
internal control system provides assurances for adherence to established operating and financial
policies, thereby reducing the likelihood of errors and fraud. Therefore, firms with effective
internal controls are less likely to restate their financials or face SEC enforcement actions, and
thus are more likely to issue an RMR.
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Abbott et al. 2000; Beasley et al. 2000), we also
recognize that effective governance mechanisms, such as independent and active audit
committees, are essential ingredients for effective internal controls and operating systems.
Accordingly, we predict that audit committees dominated by outside members and that meet
frequently can positively influence executives’ confidence in the financial statements and their
willingness to opine on them. To reduce investors’ concern for information asymmetry, firms
with extensive need for external financing have more incentives to provide expanded disclosures.
Therefore, we predict that firms with frequent issuances of debt and equity capital are more likely
to issue an RMR. We also predict that the issuance of an RMR is associated with a firm’s
profitability and ownership structure.
Consistent with our predictions, univariate tests disclose differences between RMR
issuers and non-issuers as to the effectiveness of the firm’s internal control system, access to
capital markets, audit committee characteristics, and ownership structure. The logistic regression
results also support several of the predictions. Management’s decision to issue an RMR is
associated with the effectiveness of a firm’s internal controls, where RMR firms have a lower
probability of financial fraud relative to non-RMR firms. Our findings also show the decision to
issue an RMR is positively related to the frequency of debt issuance, confirming the prediction
that reporting firms use RMRs to signal transparency in their financial reporting to market
participants. The results also indicate that corporate governance structure, in particular the
presence of an active and independent audit committee, has a positive effect on management’s
decision to issue an RMR. Additional analysis on a sub-sample of first-time issuers produced
results consistent with the above findings.
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Our second set of tests in the paper focuses on an empirical analysis of RMR content
among issuing firms. The findings reveal different areas of emphasis on assertions by senior
management. Although almost all reporting firms (92%) assert that management is responsible
for the preparation and integrity of financial statements, only 36% acknowledge management’s
responsibility for the system of internal controls. As important, only 41% expressed an opinion
on the effectiveness of the internal control system and only 24% included discussions of the
inherent limitations of internal controls. Cross-sectional analysis among issuers reveals that firmspecific RMR assertions are influenced by profitability, leverage, and audit committee
independence.
The study holds interesting implications for policymakers and individual users of
financial statements. From a policy standpoint, the study provides empirical evidence to inform
the ongoing debate on whether financial disclosure could be left to firm-specific (voluntary)
incentives or subject to mandatory regulation. Noting that mandated disclosures may not be
necessary, Kothari (2001) argues that a firm can achieve an optimal level of firm disclosure by
trading off the costs and benefits of the disclosures they are willing to make. Others have argued
that investors need some basic information if they are to exercise their rights and, thus,
mandatory disclosure requirements ought to be a primary feature of well-developed capital
markets (La Porta et al. 2000).
The findings of this study suggest that the willingness of firms to issue RMRs and the
level and nature of assertions made may indeed signal management’s uncertainty or concerns
over certain financial reporting or internal control matters. In this instance, the data seem to be
consistent with the requirement for the uniform certifications by public companies under the S-O
Act. Additionally, the results of the study shed light on the firm-specific environment in which
the new certification provisions can better achieve their objectives.
2. EMPIRICAL PREDICTIONS CONCERNING RMR ISSUERS
2.1 Effective Internal Controls
RMRs reveal important information concerning the completeness and accuracy of
financial information and provide insight into the components and effectiveness of a company’s
internal control structure. Accordingly, these voluntary assertions expose management to a
higher level of accountability for the financial statements and related disclosures. In order to
credibly make such assertions, top management must rely on the quality and strength of the
company’s internal control structure.4 Kinney (2000), Krishnan (2005) and other researchers
discuss the demand and
importance of quality internal controls but acknowledge difficulty (prior to the S-O Act) in
assessing such information without formal reporting by companies.
4

Prior research (Carcello et al. 2002; McMullen 1996) as well as the U.S. Auditing Standards (AICPA 1999, AU
Section 319) acknowledges that larger entities are more likely than smaller firms to possess elements of effective
internal controls such as a written code of conduct, written policy manuals, an appropriate segregation of duties, and
an internal audit function. In addition, accounting disclosure regulators (FASB, SEC) are also sensitive to the
burdens and associated costs of increased disclosure on smaller firms (Lang and Lundholm 1993). However, since
our sample reflects a matched-pair design by size, the size effect is common to all tested firms.
3
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Like Krishnan (2005), we use a firm’s restatement of its financial statements and SEC
enforcement actions as a measure of internal control effectiveness. Based on this argument, it is
more likely that RMR firms will have fewer financial statement restatements and fewer SEC
enforcement actions.
2.2 Profitability
Though research exploring the relationship between firm performance and disclosure has
displayed mixed results and may be situation specific, management may “tend to be more
forthcoming when the firm is performing well than when it is performing poorly” (Lang and
Lundholm 1993, pp.248-249). Proponents of RMRs contend that such disclosures reflect
favorably on management’s successful stewardship over the firm and are a positive signal to
investors and other parties that maintain a contractual relationship with the firm (Kinney 2000;
Willis and Lightle 2000). Accordingly, executives of profitable firms may have a higher
propensity for issuing an RMR to signal their organizational success and enhance their reputation
as effective stewards.
In contrast, one may argue that if managers use RMRs to provide such signals, firms with
lower profitability may have greater incentives to do so to reduce investor uncertainty by
clarifying their operating policies and processes. This later argument is consistent with a negative
relationship between the issuance of RMRs and profitability. Since these arguments suggest that
there are competing profitability motives for the issuance of an RMR, this paper attempts to
determine the underlying relationship between profitability and the issuance of an RMR with no
directional prediction.
2.3 Asymmetry of Information and Cost of Capital
Management possesses better access to knowledge concerning the firm’s financial
position and performance than outsiders do. Further, firms with limited internal financing and
unable to avail themselves of low-cost external financing may be forced to forgo profitable
investment opportunities. Therefore, extant theory predicts that firms that plan to tap the capital
markets have an incentive to provide voluntary disclosures to reduce information asymmetry and
reduce the firm’s cost of external financing (Aboody et al. 2004; Healy and Palepu 2001).
Sengupta (1998) adds that higher disclosure quality may reduce a lender’s perception of default
risk, thereby lowering the yield on debt. The quality or “informativeness” of disclosures can also
lead to broader coverage by analysts and a lower overall cost of borrowing (Lang and Lundholm
1996). Lastly, firms that periodically enter the capital markets for financing are subject to
scrutiny by rating agencies and other interested parties.
Management’s assertions concerning financial information, internal control effectiveness,
corporate governance and interaction with external auditors are vital to users of financial
statements and regulators. Therefore, confident chief executives are more likely to disclose these
important assertions in order to signal the reliability of reported information and possibly raise
capital at lower cost. This argument leads to the following predictions: RMR firms are more
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highly leveraged, issue debt and equity capital more frequently, and are likely to exhibit a lower
cost of debt financing than other firms.
2.4 Corporate Governance
The audit committee is the conduit that enables the board of directors to perform its
oversight function with respect to accurate and reliable financial reporting, and serves as a
critical link between the board, top management, external auditors, and the internal audit
function. Fama and Jensen (1983, p.19) posit that outside or independent board members are
likely to be more effective in mitigating conflicts between managers and shareholders due to the
“separation of top-level decision management and [decision] control,” and also face reputation
risks as prominent business leaders.
Empirical studies (Beasley et al. 2000; Beasley 1996; McMullen and Raghunandan
1996a) have disclosed that companies with financial reporting problems are less likely to have an
audit committee dominated by outside directors, and few meet more than three times per year.
Similarly, Beasley et al. (1999, pp.16-17) find that only 38 percent of firms experiencing
fraudulent financial reporting during 1987-1997 had audit committees comprised entirely of
outside directors and that most averaged approximately two meetings per year. Prior research
has also shown that audit committees that meet more frequently and are comprised of nonemployee directors can deter the use of aggressive accounting practices by management (Abbott
et al. 2000; Parker 1999). Given this discussion, we posit that independent5 and active6 audit
committees are likely to present an acute influence over senior management’s decision to publish
an RMR.
2.5 Other Factors
The literature on corporate policy decisions indicates that ownership structure is a
significant determinant of voluntary disclosure decisions by firms. Different classes of owners
exercise disparate roles in monitoring corporate policies and decisions. For instance, Jensen and
Meckling (1976, p.67) suggest that institutional investors and those “who possess comparative
advantages in these activities” are likely to be important monitors of management’s behavior.
As investors, institutional owners face a fiduciary responsibility over the funds provided by
individuals and often undertake an active role in monitoring management’s performance.
Accordingly, a higher concentration of institutional ownership in a particular firm is likely to
motivate management to provide additional voluntary disclosures in order to maintain investor
confidence (El-Gazzar 1998). Bushee and Noe (2000) also comment that institutional owners

5

In this study, characteristics that delineate “independent” versus “inside” directors follow the criteria used by
Beasley et al. (1999). In that study (p.16), an independent director was defined as one with “no disclosed
relationship (other than stock ownership) between the director and the company or its officers.” Conversely (p.16),
inside or affiliated directors include current or former officers and employees, consultants, those related to
management, and those associated with major suppliers, customers, or creditors of the firm.
6
Recent audit committee recommendations (Business Roundtable 2005, p.20; Blue Ribbon Committee 1999)
suggest that a higher frequency of meetings (at least four or more) is necessary to improve effectiveness and enhance
oversight responsibilities.
5
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are “sensitive” to disclosure if such information serves to reduce the volatility of stock prices,
enhances profitable trading opportunities, and offers additional insight into corporate governance
practices. Based on this argument, we predict a positive relationship between the magnitude of
institutional ownership of a company and senior management’s tendency to voluntarily issue an
RMR.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) also assert that higher firm ownership by management
narrows the divergence between its interests and those of outside owners. This closer alignment
may relax senior management’s need to signal the fulfillment of its stewardship role to outside
owners. Accordingly, senior management at firms with higher levels of equity ownership by
management (e.g., officers, directors, and other defined individuals) are less likely to offer
voluntary information above that which is mandatory. This discussion is consistent with a
negative relationship between the magnitude of managerial ownership of a company and senior
management’s tendency to voluntarily issue an RMR.
3. RESEARCH DESIGN
3.1 Sample and Data
To test the above predictions, this study uses a total random sample of 500 firms,
distributed as 100 firms per year for the period 1996 to 2000, from the population of companies
annually surveyed in the AICPA’s Accounting Trends and Techniques (ATT). ATT provides a
supplemental classification of firms regarding their reporting on RMRs, which is fundamental to
conduct the current research.7 The base sample was then screened against the following criteria:
(1) data availability in COMPUSTAT; (2) completeness of data on audit committees’ structure
and meetings; (3) confounding events including mergers and acquisitions, and (4) repeated
companies. Panel A of Table 1 presents the sample selection and elimination process. From the
screened sample, 192 firms were identified as RMR issuers.
To alleviate a possible ATT membership bias towards large firms in our treatment sample,
we matched the RMR issuers to a control sample of non-RMR issuers based on size, industry,
and year from the general population of ATT and COMPUSTAT firms. We were unable to obtain
this three-dimensional match for 14 companies. Thus, our final matched-pairs sample consists of
178 companies, as shown in Panel B of Table 1. Although our tests focus primarily on
characteristics of firms using RMRs as a disclosure policy, we identify 24 first-time issuers from
our sample. Additional analysis was then conducted on these first-time issuers to learn more
about management incentives in issuing an RMR.

7

The ATT population includes a broad representation of industrial and service firms of diverse size from over 40
industries. It also excludes banks, insurance firms, utilities and other sectors that possess unique financial
characteristics or are subject to particular regulatory influences or incentives.
6
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TABLE 1
Summary of Sample Selection and Classification
Panel A: Sample Reconciliation
Base sample (1996 – 2000)
Sample Eliminations:
1. Insufficient annual data from COMPUSTAT for the
measuring variables
2. Missing audit committee information and other data due
to mergers and acquisitions
3. Extreme observations
4. Repeated firms
5. Non-Issuing firms
Issuing Firms

Number of Firms
500

37
23
16
103

(179)
(129)
192

Panel B: Matched Pairs (Size, Industry, and Year)
Issuing firms
Less: Firms with no match
Matched-pairs: Issuing Firms
Matched-pairs: Non-Issuing Firms
Final Sample
First Time Adopters

192
(14)
178
178
356
24

3.2 Model
We employ two regression models to test our predictions. First, the logistic regression8
model (1) below is used to examine the influence of firm-specific characteristics on senior
management’s decision to issue an RMR. Second, the OLS regression model (2) below is used to
examine the relationship between the content (assertions) reported in RMRs and the explanatory
variables, including company size.

8

Logistic regression is appropriate for this portion of the study due to the binary nature of the dependent variable.
For each observation, senior management either issues an RMR or not. Essentially, logistic regression estimates the
probability of this discrete decision given an array of explanatory variables (Hair et al. 1998, pp. 276-277).
7
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RMRi =

CONTi =

+ 1 ICEFFi + 2 ROAi + 3 FREQDi +
+ 5 LTDEi + 6 AINTi + 7 AUDINDi +
+ 9 INSTIT%i + 10 MANAG%i + i

0

0

4 FREQSi
8 AUDMETi

+ 1 ICEFFi + 2 ROAi + 3 FREQDi + 4 FREQSi
+ 5 LTDEi + 6 AINTi + 7 AUDINDi + 8 AUDMETi
+ 9 INSTIT%i + 10 MANAG%i + 11 SIZEi + i

(1)

(2)

3.3 Definitions of Variables 9
The measuring variables in models (1) and (2) above are defined below.
Variable
Dependent:
RMR

CONT

Independent:
ICEFF
ROA

Description

Report of Management’s Responsibility. This is a dichotomous variable
that represents senior management’s disclosure decision. RMR takes the
value of 1 for firms that voluntarily reported on their responsibilities and 0
otherwise.
Content of RMR Assertions. We developed a disclosure index based upon
the content of the firm’s RMR using an index of 30 assertions commonly
found in such disclosures (see Table 5). CONT represents each firm’s actual
number of assertions disclosed divided by the maximum number in the
index. CONTi = L of Firm i’s assertions / Maximum Number of Assertions in the Index.
A dummy variable where 1 represents a firm with a financial statement
restatement or an SEC Enforcement Action, and 0 if not.
A three-year average of the Return on Assets calculated as follows:
t=0

ROA =

FREQD
FREQS
LTDE

t = -2

Net Income (continuing operations) + Interest Expense (after-tax)
Total Assets

Number of new public debt issues in the test period (1996 to 2000).
Number of new equity issues in the test period (1996 to 2000).
Total long-term debt/stockholders’ equity at year-end.

9

Data to calculate ROA, LTDE, AINT and SIZE was extracted from the COMPUSTAT database. Data for
AUDIND and AUDMET were collected from the examination of annual proxy statements. Ownership percentages
for INSTIT% and MANAG% were retrieved from Compact Disclosure. ICEFF was identified from the
COMPUSTAT and SEC databases. FREQD and FREQS were obtained from Moody’s debt and equity records of
new issues for the period of study.
8
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AINT

The average interest rate on the firm’s outstanding debt.

AUDIND

The percentage of independent to total audit committee members, where
independence is defined as external members with no disclosed financial
relationship (other than equity ownership) or employment with the firm.
A dummy variable where 1 represents a firm with at least three audit
committee meetings during the year, and 0 if not. We use audit committee
activity as a proxy for effectiveness.10
The percentage of voting shares owned by institutional owners at year-end.

AUDMET

INSTIT%
MANAG%

The percentage of voting shares owned by management such as officers,
directors, and other defined individuals at year-end.

SIZE

The natural log of total assets (in millions) at year-end.

4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Panel A of Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the measuring variables for the total
sample and the partitioned sample for RMR issuers and non-issuers. Univariate tests of the
differences in means are also presented and indicate clear demarcations between the two groups.
RMR firms have on average a lower percentage of restatements of financial reports and SEC
enforcement actions (p<0.05), providing support for our prediction concerning internal control
effectiveness. Although not statistically significant, the profitability variable (ROA: return on
assets) shows that the average net income per dollar of assets for reporting firms (.069) is higher
than for the non-RMR firms (0.062). The surrogates for capital market access and information
asymmetry indicate that RMR firms issue public debt (FREQD) and equity (FREQS) more
frequently (p<0.01 and p<0.05, respectively) than non-RMR firms and have higher leverage
(LTDE); although the latter variable is not significant. This is consistent with our prediction that
firms issue RMRs to signal the credibility of reported information for investors, thereby reducing
information asymmetry in the marketplace.
With respect to corporate governance, audit committee independence (AUDIND) and
audit committee effectiveness (AUDMET) show that RMR issuers have a higher percentage of
outside directors and meet more frequently than those of non-issuers, both statistically significant
at p<0.01. The statistics on ownership structure disclose that RMR issuers have a greater
percentage of equity owned by institutional investors (INSTIT%) but a lower percentage owned
by management (MANAG%), both statistically significant at p<0.01. This result is consistent
with the expectation that institutional investors exercise greater monitoring over investees,
causing management to expand disclosure for stockholders.
10

Prior research involving audit committee activity (e.g., Abbott et al. 2000; Parker 1999; Beasley et al. 1999)
suggests that a threshold of at least three meetings per year was necessary during this time period for an audit
committee to be deemed minimally effective. In this study, we use this threshold to delineate effective (i.e., active)
from ineffective audit committees.
9
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As a sensitivity check, additional analysis of RMR first-time adopters was conducted. The
results, as reported in Panel B of Table 2, confirm the effects of internal control effectiveness,
access to capital markets, and corporate governance on management’s decision to issue an RMR.
We find that first-time issuers have, on average, lower instances of restatements of financial
statements or SEC enforcement actions (ICEFF). First time RMR firms also exhibit a higher
frequency of public debt issuance (FREQD), more audit committee meetings (AUDMET), and a
lower average interest rate on debt (AINT) than their matched non-RMR firms.
The correlation matrix in Table 3 reveals low to moderate correlation between the
explanatory variables. A review of the Variance Inflation Factor for each variable reveals no
significant multicollinearity.

10
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TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics of the Independent Variables and Group Differences
Panel A: Total Sample, RMR Issuers and Non-Issuers

Variable
ICEFF

Group
All
Issuers
Non-Issuers

ROA

All
0.066
Issuers
0.069
Non-Issuers 0.062

0.049
0.051
0.047

0.040
0.043
0.033

0.061
0.067
0.057

0.089
0.092
0.085

1.49

All
0.60
Issuers
0.78
Non-Issuers 0.41

0.87
0.98
0.71

0.00
0.00
0.00

0.00
0.00
0.00

1.00
1.00
1.00

4.10 ***

All
1.17
Issuers
1.39
Non-Issuers 0.96

1.86
2.06
1.61

0.00
0.00
0.00

0.00
0.00
0.00

2.00
3.00
2.00

2.17 **

All
0.81
Issuers
0.84
Non-Issuers 0.78

0.88
0.94
0.81

0.27
0.31
0.20

0.54
0.55
0.52

1.05
1.05
1.04

0.63

All
0.08
Issuers
0.07
Non-Issuers 0.08

0.04
0.03
0.05

0.06
0.06
0.05

0.07
0.07
0.07

0.09
0.09
0.09

-0.59

All
0.85
Issuers
0.89
Non-Issuers 0.81

0.24
0.16
0.30

0.75
0.75
0.67

1.00
1.00
1.00

1.00
1.00
1.00

3.35 ***

All
0.69
Issuers
0.79
Non-Issuers 0.60

0.46
0.41
0.49

0.00
1.00
0.00

1.00
1.00
1.00

1.00
1.00
1.00

4.02 ***

All
0.58
Issuers
0.61
Non-Issuers 0.55

0.23
0.20
0.25

0.45
0.53
0.39

0.62
0.66
0.59

0.76
0.76
0.75

2.88 ***

All
0.09
0.06
Issuers
Non-Issuers 0.13

0.20
0.14
0.23

0.01
0.00
0.01

0.02
0.01
0.03

0.08
0.04
0.13

-3.32 ***

FREQD

FREQS

LTDE

AINT

AUDIND

AUDMET

INSTIT%

MANAG%

Mean
0.17
0.14
0.21

Group Difference:
Standard
25th
50th
75% Issuers – Non-Issuers
Z-Value (a)
Deviation Percentile Percentile Percentile
0.38
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.35
0.00
0.00
0.00
-1.67 **
0.41
0.00
0.00
0.00

11

Management’s Responsibility for Financial Reporting

TABLE 2 (continued)
Panel B: First Time RMR Issuers and Matched Sample of Non-Issuers
First-Time RMR Issuers (N=24) Matched Sample: Non-Issuers (N=24)
Mean
0.21

Standard
Deviation
0.41

Median
0.00

Group
Difference:
Z-Value (a)
-1.24 *

Variable
ICEFF

Mean
0.08

Standard
Deviation
0.28

ROA

0.073

0.039

0.063

0.060

0.039

0.063

1.13

FREQD

1.13

1.15

1.00

0.29

0.55

0.00

3.19 ***

FREQS

1.75

1.59

2.00

1.50

1.91

0.00

0.49

LTDE

0.68

0.58

0.55

0.66

0.79

0.38

0.03

AINT

0.06

0.03

0.07

0.09

0.08

0.07

-1.30 *

AUDIND

0.89

0.21

1.00

0.81

0.28

1.00

1.17

AUDMET

0.79

0.41

1.00

0.50

0.51

0.50

2.09 **

INSTIT%

0.67

0.19

0.67

0.60

0.23

0.63

1.04

MANAG%

0.12

0.20

0.02

0.09

0.17

0.02

0.62

Median
0.00

(a) *, **, *** Significant at p < 0.10, p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively. (ROA is based on a two-tailed test).
Group differences in means for continuous variables are based on t-tests. The between-group differences in location
for the binary variables ICEFF and AUDMET are based upon the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test.
See Section 3.3 for variable definitions.
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TABLE 3
Pearson Pairwise Correlations of the Independent Variables
N = 356

ICEFF
ICEFF
ROA
FREQD
FREQS
LTDE
AINT
AUDIND
AUDMET
INSTIT%
MANAG%

ROA

FREQD FREQS

LTDE

AINT

1.00
0.10*
0.02
-0.03
0.07
0.13*
0.17**
-0.14**

1.00
0.01
0.01
-0.01
-0.03
0.03

1.00
-0.10
-0.04
-0.03
0.04

AUDIND AUDMET INSTIT% MANAG%

1.00
-0.03
0.03
0.02
0.04
-0.03
0.05
-0.02
0.06
-0.10*

1.00
-0.01
0.02
-0.24**
-0.07
0.11*
0.02
0.15**
-0.04

1.00
0.03
0.01
0.03
0.08
0.06
-0.09

*, ** Pearson correlation coefficients are significant at p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively (two-tailed)
See Section 3.3 for variable definitions.
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1.00
0.28**
0.31**
-0.33**

1.00
0.25**
-0.24**

1.00
-0.45**

1.00
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4.2 Results of the Logit Model
This section analyzes the results of the Logit multiple regression model and presents
statistics on the relative influence of each factor in management’s decision on RMRs. Table 4
presents the coefficient estimates of regressing management’s decision to issue RMRs against the
explanatory variables. Results are presented separately for the total sample (356 firms) and firsttime adopters (48 firms).
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TABLE 4
Logistic Regression Coefficients of the Explanatory Variables on RMR Issuance
Coefficient (Chi-square)
Variable

Expected Sign

Intercept

?

-1.79
(7.74) ***

-0.82
(0.08)

ICEFF

-

-0.63
(4.33) **

-0.01
(0.01)

ROA

+/-

3.42
(1.93)

14.48
(0.61)

Total Sample

0.45
(10.09) ***

First-Time Issuers

1.26
(3.94) **

FREQD

+

FREQS

+

0.09
(2.20)

-0.09
(0.14)

LTDE

+

0.13
(0.87)

0.07
(0.01)

AINT

-

-0.45
(0.03)

-7.18
(0.51)

AUDIND

+

0.97
(3.09) *

0.05
(0.01)

AUDMET

+

0.65
(6.21) ***

2.05
(4.70) **

INSTIT%

+

MANAG%

-

0.11
(0.03)
-1.31
(2.74) *

-1.76
(0.39)
-0.35
(0.01)

F Statistic
Pseudo R2
Sample size

47.68 ***
12%
356 firms

20.04 **
35%
48 firms

The Wald (Chi-square) statistic is indicated in parentheses
*, **, *** Coefficient statistically significant at p < 0.10, p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively. (ROA is based on a
two-tailed test).
See Section 3.3 for variable definitions.
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The results for the total sample in Table 4 show that the coefficient of the internal control
effectiveness (ICEFF) is negative and significant (p<0.05), suggesting that RMR firms are likely
to experience fewer incidences of financial fraud or disclosure violations. This reinforces the
inference that RMR firms have more effective internal control systems. The coefficient of
profitability (ROA) is positive but insignificant, suggesting profitability is not an influencing
factor in management’s policy to issue RMRs. The effect of a firm’s frequent issuance of public
debt (FREQD) on management’s policy to issue an RMR is positive and significant (p<0.01),
supporting the inference that through RMRs firms attempt to reduce investors’ concerns for
information asymmetry.
The results of the audit committee variables support the expected corporate governance
relationships. The coefficients for audit committee independence (AUDIND) and effectiveness
(AUDMET) are both positive and statistically significant at p<0.10 and p<0.01, respectively,
confirming the direct influence of monitoring on management’s RMR decision. The coefficient
of debt financing (LTDE) has the expected positive sign but lacks statistical significance. The
ownership structure variables (INSTIT% and MANAG%) have the expected sign, and the latter
is significant at p<0.10.11
For the first-time adopters, the results in Table 4 show that the coefficients for FREQD
and AUDMET are positive and statistically significant at p<0.05. These findings confirm the
influences of public debt issuance and audit committee effectiveness on management’s initial
decision to issue an RMR. All of the other variables except for FREQS and INSTIT% are in the
expected direction. The results are largely consistent with those for the total sample.
4.3 RMR Assertions
The second objective of this paper is to analyze the contents of the voluntarily-issued
RMR. It is of great interest to regulators and users of financial statements to understand
management’s assertions and whether or not they are common across firms. We developed an
RMR content index of 30 assertions (equally weighted) based on prior recommendations set forth
by the Cohen Commission (1978), Treadway Commission (1987), the Committee of Sponsoring
Organizations (COSO 1992), and existing practice. Extending prior studies, (e.g., Willis and
Lightle 2000; McMullen et al. 1996b), we analyzed each of the 192 RMRs in our sample and
classified management’s assertions into the following five categories: responsibility for financial
statements, system of internal controls (and elements), corporate governance, independent
auditors, and signatures of senior officers. Table 5 lists the coding and frequency results of
management assertions found in the sample.

11

To examine the effect of auditing firm “quality” on management’s RMR decision, an analysis of the sample firms
revealed that over 85% were audited by Big 5 firms. No further analysis was necessary to examine this additional
factor.
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TABLE 5
Management Assertions and Frequency in Voluntarily-Issued RMRs (N=192)
Assertions by Category
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Financial Statements
Management is responsible for the preparation/integrity of the financial statements
The financial statements have been prepared in accordance with GAAP
The financial statements include estimates and the judgment of management
Management is responsible for the “other” financial information
The “other” financial information is consistent with the financial statements
Representations by management are valid and appropriate
System of Internal Controls
Management is responsible for (or maintains) the system of internal controls
The purpose of the internal control system:
• Safeguard assets
• Execute transactions in accordance with management’s authorization
• Prepare reliable financial information
Inherent limitations in internal controls (reasonable assurance, cost/benefits)
Other limitations in the internal control system (errors, oversight, etc.)
Elements of the internal control system:
• Appropriate segregation of duties or division of responsibilities
• Established guidelines, policies and procedures
• Code of professional conduct/improve ethical climate
• Careful selection and training of personnel
• Monitored by the internal auditing function
Other Commentary on Internal Controls:
• Actions are taken to correct control deficiencies or enhance the system
• An opinion as to the reliability/effectiveness internal controls
• Criteria used (e.g., COSO Report) to assess effectiveness of controls
Corporate Governance
An Audit Committee exists
The Audit Committee consists entirely of members who are independent (not
officers or employees) of the entity
A discussion of the Audit Committee’s role and/or activities (oversight over
management and/or financial reporting)
The independent auditors are recommended by the Audit Committee and/or
approved by shareholders
Independent Auditors
An independent accounting firm has audited the financial statements
The auditors have ready access to the Audit Committee
The audit was conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards
The internal control system was reviewed during the performance of the audit
Signed by Senior Management
• Chairman of the Board, Vice Chair, Chief Executive Officer, or President
• CFO, Chief Accounting Officer, or other senior officer
17

Index
92%
97%
90%
60%
29%
4%
36%
85%
50%
83%
24%
8%
31%
52%
30%
44%
79%
21%
41%
1%
96%
89%
96%
34%
84%
65%
40%
40%
68%
80%
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From Table 5, the heterogeneity and selectivity of the assertions disclosed by
management are apparent. For instance, almost all firms (92%) stated that management is
responsible for the financial statements and 97% stated that they have been prepared in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. Yet, only 36% of the sample firms
acknowledged management’s responsibility for the system of internal controls, only 24%
discussed the inherent limitations in the system, and 21% mentioned that actions were taken to
correct control deficiencies or enhance the system.
The results in Table 5 indicate that firms are very selective in the type of voluntary
disclosures made in the RMR. In each of the disclosure categories, we find that the vast majority
of the firms disclose the “general assertions,” with the specific and/or detailed assertions
provided with lower frequency. For instance, in the financial statement category, 90% of the
firms stated that financial statements include estimates and judgments by management, yet only
4% of the firms assert that those judgments and representations are “valid and appropriate” as
recommended by the Treadway Commission (1987) and COSO (1992). Furthermore, in the
corporate governance category, 96% of the firms report on the presence of the audit committee
and 89% on its composition, while only 34% stated that the audit committee recommended the
independent auditor.
The diversity in disclosure provides additional insight into the activities and effectiveness
of the audit committee’s role within the firm and is consistent with recent findings on the
variance between responsibilities disclosed in audit committee charters and actual performance
(Carcello et al. 2002). This diversity in the voluntary assertions contained in RMRs supports the
mandated and uniform certification requirements in the S-O Act as well as recent SEC and stock
exchange requirements on corporate governance and expanded disclosure.
To examine the effect of the firm-specific attributes on the actual level of management’s
assertions, we regressed the content index (CONT) against the explanatory variables of the 192
issuing firms. We also developed a second “internal control content” index based upon the
frequencies of management assertions 7 through 20 from Table 5. The results of the OLS
regressions in Table 6 show that the influences on each index are consistent with respect to a
number of factors. The coefficient for audit committee independence (AUDIND) in both models
is positive and statistically significant at p<0.01, suggesting that independent audit committee
members exert a strong influence on the content of management’s assertions as part of their
oversight role. Moreover, both models indicate that RMR content is significantly and positively
influenced by the degree of leverage (LTDE) and company size (SIZE). Lastly, profitability
(ROA) is significantly and positively associated with the overall level of assertions. We ran both
models excluding SIZE and found the results (unreported) remain unchanged.
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TABLE 6
OLS Estimates of Regressing RMR Contents on the Explanatory Variables (N=192)

Variable
Intercept

Expected Sign
?

Coefficient (t-value) of Disclosure Scores
Index of Internal
Index of All
Control Assertions
RMR Assertions
-0.03
0.16
(0.32)
(2.57)***

ICEFF

-

0.03
(1.00)

-0.01
(0.05)

ROA

+/-

0.33
(1.48)

0.43
(2.83)***

FREQD

+

-0.01
(0.15)

-0.01
(0.38)

FREQS

+

-0.01
(1.18)

-0.01
(0.86)

LTDE

+

0.02
(2.26)**

0.01
(2.17)**

AINT

-

0.42
(1.21)

0.26
(1.07)

AUDIND

+

0.25
(3.73)***

0.22
(4.75)***

AUDMET

+

INSTIT%

+

MANAG%

-

0.01
(0.28)
0.01
(0.21)
0.02
(0.26)

0.01
(0.03)
0.01
(0.04)
0.07
(1.19)

0.02
(2.16) *

0.02
(2.79) ***

SIZE

+/-

F-Statistic
R2
Number of Assertions

2.95***
15%
14

4.23***
20%
30

t- statistics are indicated in parentheses
*, **, *** Coefficient statistically significant at p<0.10, p < 0.05 and p< 0.01, respectively. (ROA and SIZE are
based on two-tailed tests).
See Section 3.3 for variable definitions.
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5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
For a quarter-century prior to the S-O Act, senior management had discretion in deciding
whether to publicly disclose its responsibilities for financial reporting. However, the S-O Act
has re-emphasized management’s critical role over financial reporting and internal controls and
heightened the risks of failure to act in accordance with these responsibilities. This paper
examines the characteristics and incentives of firms issuing RMRs as a voluntary disclosure
policy and identifies management assertions included therein.
The results of the study show that RMR issuing firms are less likely to restate their
financial reports and/or face SEC enforcement actions. These measures validate the positive
influence of the company’s internal control effectiveness on management’s decision to
voluntarily issue an RMR. This finding has particular implications for smaller companies as well
as non-reporting firms (prior to the S-O Act) where more formal or effective financial reporting
and internal control processes may be absent. Indeed, the SEC is currently studying the
possibility of relaxing elements of Section 404 reporting for smaller firms and whether or not
voluntary disclosure may be sufficient. The findings of the study further confirm the positive
influence of the audit committee oversight on management’s actions. The results also reveal that
firms with frequent issuances of debt are more likely to issue RMRs, suggesting that reporting
firms use RMRs to signal the reliability of reported information, thereby reducing investors’
information asymmetry.
The analysis of the contents of the sample RMRs indicates management’s tendency
towards voluntary disclosure of “general” assertions in delineating its responsibilities for
financial information. However, firms are averse to disclosure of specific assertions such as
deficiencies within the internal control system, the effectiveness of the system, and whether the
audit committee recommended the external auditor. Variations in these assertions in a given
RMR are also influenced by a number of firm-specific attributes such as company size,
profitability, audit committee independence and degree of leverage.
Further research can be expanded to include other special industries such as financial
services, utilities, and airlines where particular influences and additional variables are likely
required. Additionally, a comparative analysis of the contents of voluntarily reported RMRs and
mandated disclosures under the S-O Act would shed further light on the ongoing debate of
voluntary versus mandated disclosure.
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